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ABSTRACT 
This chapter advocates the convergence between Access Control (AC) models focusing on the 
granularity of sharing and Digital Right Management (DRM) models focusing on conditional 
authorizations and obligations. The convergence is also expected in terms of control 
enforcement considering that both AC and DRM models must be equally protected against any 
form of tampering and piracy. We capitalize on the democratization of powerful secure chip 
platforms (e.g., smart cards, secure USB dongles) which can be plugged in a variety of client 
devices (PC, PDA, cell phones, consumer electronics) to design a new architecture of a trusted 
access and usage control system. The benefits of the proposed architecture are exemplified in 
two different contexts: a fair DRM scenario and a healthcare scenario. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In computer systems, access control models are used to express who is granted privilege 
to execute which actions on which set of resources. Many works have been conducted on access 
control management in the database context, trying to provide the finest granularity of sharing. In 
relational database systems, privileges can be granted on virtual objects, called views, 
dynamically built by an SQL query (Melton et al., 1993). In XML databases, XPath expressions 
are usually used to delineate the objects or document parts targeted by an access control rule 
(Bertino et al., 2001; Gabillon et al., 2001; Damiani et al., 2002). The reason for this granularity 
concern is that databases often contain sensitive information (e.g., personal, commercial, 
administrative, military data) shared by a large number of users playing different roles with 
different privileges. Digital Right Management (DRM) models are also used to regulate the 
access to resources. DRM models primarily target the protection of digital assets (e.g., videos 
and sounds). The granularity of the access control is of lesser concern here but the conditions 
(e.g., to pay a fee) and obligations (e.g., to increment a counter at each copy) related to how a 
privilege can be exercised become central (XrML; ODRL). Hence DRM models complement 
access control with usage control. Another major concern of DRM systems is the enforcement of 
the access and usage control rules to fight against a large scale piracy threatening the global 
multimedia content industry (IFPI).  
As the information distributed to customers becomes more complex and structured (e.g., 
encyclopaedia, cultural collections, stock exchange databases) the need for finer granularity rules 
arise in the DRM context. Conversely, as database applications show an increasing concern for 
regulating the usage made of the information legally accessed, the need for access control rules 
integrating contextual conditions and obligations arises. This is particularly true for databases 
containing personal data (Agrawal et al., 2002). The management of Electronic Health Records 
illustrates this well. For example, permissive access control rules should apply to a medical 
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folder in specific contexts like an emergency situation. Obligations like registering all accesses to 
a medical folder in a log are also required to allow auditing the system. 
In this chapter, we advocate the convergence between the access control and DRM 
worlds, encompassing the expression of fine grain access control and accurate usage control. 
This convergence is also expected in terms of control enforcement. In database environments, 
the access control is usually enforced by the database server, under the assumption that the server 
is trusted. Unfortunately, even the most defended servers (including those of Pentagon, FBI and 
NASA) have been successfully attacked, and database systems are identified as the primary 
target of computer criminality (Computer Security Institute, 2007). This motivated the design of 
new architectures where the server role amounts to deliver raw content to smart clients 
implementing the access control (Bouganim et al., 2004; Hacigumus et al., 2002). The question 
becomes how to enforce access and usage control on the client side. This question is not new in 
the DRM context, though no satisfactory solutions have been proposed yet. Indeed, today’s 
DRM methods are so coercive that they do nothing but exasperating consumers and legitimize 
piracy (Champeau, 2004). The question is newer in the database world, people slowly becoming 
aware of the value of personal data and starting considering that protecting privacy is at least as 
important as protecting digital assets. 
This chapter suggests solutions to enforce access and usage control on the client side 
thanks to secure hardware. Secure chips appear today in various form factors (smart cards, USB 
secure tokens, TPM, etc). They can be used to implement a Secure Operating Environment (i.e., 
a tamper-resistant storage and execution environment) in any device they are plugged in. This 
Secure Operating Environment is the required building block to design future trusted access and 
usage control systems. The suggested approach is expected to pave the way for new fair DRM 
models and for privacy conscious models of exchanging personal data. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background material on access 
control models, DRM models and secure hardware and sketches in this light an architecture for 
future trusted access and usage control systems. Section 3 summarizes two previous works 
related to the enforcement of XML access control policies in secure chip and the management of 
data embedded on chip. These works can be seen as building blocks for the aforementioned 
architecture. Section 4 illustrates the benefit of the suggested architecture in two different contexts: 
a fair DRM scenario and a healthcare scenario. Section 5 concludes discussing future trends. 
2. BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED APPROACH 
2.1. Access control & DRM models 
2.1.1. Access Control models 
An access control model is a framework by which security administrators grant or revoke 
the right to access some data or perform some action in a system. The set of authorizations 
regulating the use of all resources of a system is called an access control policy. Authorizations 
can take different forms depending on the underlying data model. For example, an authorization 
over a relational database is usually expressed as granting the permission to execute a given 
action (e.g., Select) on a relational table or view (i.e., a virtual table computed by an SQL query) 
(Melton et al., 1993). An authorization over a XML document is usually expressed as a 
composition of positive (resp. negative) rules selecting authorized (resp. forbidden) sub-trees in 
the document thanks to XPath expressions (Bertino et al., 2001; Gabillon et al., 2001; Damiani et 
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al., 2002). Another dimension of the access control model is the way by which authorizations are 
administered, following a Discretionary (DAC) (Harrison et al., 1976), a Role-Based (RBAC) 
(Sandhu et al., 1996) or a Mandatory (MAC) approach (Bell et al., 1976). In this chapter, we do 
no restrictive assumption on the way authorizations are actually expressed and administered, 
except for illustrative purposes. We also consider both the relational and XML contexts even 
though a large part of this chapter focuses on the XML data model. Indeed, XML allows 
illustrating access control rules in a simple and intuitive way and is the preferred syntax for most 
existing DRM languages. We thus briefly detail below the XML and XPath syntax before 
presenting examples of XML access control rules.  
XML has become a de-facto standard for the presentation, exchange and management of 
any information. Figure 1 shows a sample of XML metadata describing an MPEG-21 video. 
Roughly speaking, an XML document can be seen as a tree of elements, each one demarcated by 
an opening and closing tag (e.g., <Seq> and </Seq> for the Seq element). Attributes may be 
attached to elements (e.g., attribute value of the analysis element). Terminal elements (at the 
leaves of the tree) are represented by text (e.g., Closer). 
 
<Video> 
 <Title> Closer </Title> 
 <Film> 
  <Seq>  
   <Desc> …… </Desc> 
   <SexRating> 3 </SexRating> 
   <Key> xxxxxxxxxx </Key> 
  </Seq> 
  <Seq>….</Seq> 
 </Film> 
 <Bonus> 
  <Seq>….</Seq> 
  …. 
 </Bonus> 
 <Analysis Value = "Technical"> 
  <Seq>….</Seq> 
 </Analysis> 
</Video>  
 
Figure 1. An MPEG 21 XML document 
Queries can be expressed over an XML document using the XPath language. An XPath 
expression allows to navigate in the document through the parent axis (denoted by /) and the 
descendant axis (denoted by //) and to apply predicates on elements and attributes. The result of 
an XPath expression is an element (or a group of elements) along with its (their) subtree(s). For 
example, the XPath expression /Video/Film/Seq/Key selects all the decryption keys of the 
sequences of the film while //Seq[SexRating>3] selects any sequence (anywhere in the 
document) having a direct child SexRating whose value is greater than 3. 
Different authorization models have been proposed to regulate access to XML 
documents, tackling different facets of the problem. A particular attention has been paid on the 
granularity of the access control (from DTD to attribute instances) (Bertino et al., 2000; Damiani 
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et al., 2002; Gabillon et al., 2001), on the performance of the algorithms implementing this 
control (Cho et al., 2002; Murata et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2001), on the distribution channel 
used to expose the information (pull, push, selective dissemination) (Bertino et al., 2002; Birget et 
al., 2001; OASIS Standard) and on the tamper-resistance of the access control (Bouganim et al., 
2004; Miklau et al., 2002; Ray et al., 2002).
Roughly speaking, an access control policy is composed of a set of positive (resp. 
negative) authorization rules granting (resp. denying) a given subject access to some nodes of the 
document. These nodes are usually selected thanks to XPath expressions. The descendant 
relationship among nodes is simply exploited as a mean to propagate authorization rules down 
through the XML hierarchy. There are substantial differences among the models in the way 
conflicts among – potentially propagated – positive and negative rules are tackled. In (Bertino et 
al., 2000; Gabillon et al., 2001), the complete subtree rooted at a forbidden node is forbidden. 
This constraint is relaxed in (Damiani et al., 2002)], allowing exceptions to a negative rule to be 
expressed. However, this leads to make visible the label (i.e., tag) of forbidden ancestor(s) in the 
path from the root to an authorized node. Replacing the node label by a dummy value has been 
proposed in (Fan et al., 2004; Gabillon, 2004) to reduce information disclosure in such situation. 
For the sake of clarity and conciseness, we consider in this chapter a simplified access 
control model for XML, inspired by Bertino’s model (Bertino et al., 2001) because several 
models share this same foundation. Subtleties of this model are ignored.  In this simplified 
model, access control rules take the form of a 3-uple <subject, sign, object>. Subject denotes a 
user or a group of users. Sign denotes either a permission (positive rule) or a prohibition 
(negative rule) for the read operation (updates are not considered). Object corresponds to 
elements or subtrees in the XML document, identified by an XPath expression. The expressive 
power of the access control model, and then the granularity of sharing, is directly bounded by the 
supported subset of the XPath language. We consider in this chapter a robust subset of XPath 
denoted by XP{[],*,//} (Miklau et al., 2002). This subset, widely used in practice, consists of node 
tests, the child axis (/), the descendant axis (//), wildcards (*) and predicates or branches […]. 
Attributes are handled in the model similarly to elements and are not further discussed. 
For simplification purpose again, we consider that the cascading propagation of rules is 
implicit in the model, meaning that a rule propagates from an object to all its descendants in the 
XML hierarchy. Due to the rule propagation along the hierarchy and to the multiplicity of rules 
for a same user, a conflict resolution principle is required. Conflicts are resolved using two 
policies: 1) Denial-Takes-Precedence, which states that if two rules of opposite signs apply on 
the same object, then the negative one prevails and 2) Most-Specific-Object-Takes-Precedence, 
which states that a rule which applies directly to an object takes precedence over a propagated 
rule. Finally, if a subject is granted access to an object, it is also assumed to be granted access to 
the path from the document root to this object (As in (Fan et al., 2004; Gabillon, 2004), names of 
denied elements in this path can be replaced by a dummy value). This Structural rule keeps the 
document structure consistent with respect to the original one. 
2.1.2. DRM languages 
Several initiatives, e.g., XrML (XRML), MPEG-REL (ContentGuard, 2004), ODRL 
(ODRL), XACML (OASIS Standard), XMCL (XMCL, 2001), demonstrate the need for 
expressive and extensible DRM languages capable of implementing a large variety of business 
models. Some of these initiatives are gaining a wide acceptance. For example, XrML from 
ContentGuard is used by Microsoft in its DRM implementations. XrML also formed the basis for 
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MPEG REL, the Rights Expression Language of MPEG-21. The Open Digital Rights Language 
has been adopted by the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) for its DRM standard. While different in 
their syntax and usages, the DRM languages mentioned above share strong commonalities. To 
illustrate this, let us consider XrML as a reference language. The constituents of an XrML grant 
(the central part of an XrML license) are: 
• The principal to whom the grant is issued. 
• The right that the grant specifies.  
• The resource that is the direct object of the “right” verb. 
• The condition that specifies the terms, conditions and obligations under which the 
right can be exercised. 
Principal, right and resource are respectively named party, right and asset in ODRL and 
subject, action and resource in XACML with a similar meaning. ODRL integrates conditions 
within the right statement while XACML distinguishes between conditions and obligations. 
XACML supports also denials (i.e., negative authorizations) in addition to grants. The way a 
right is actually exercised is implementation dependent and may differ depending on the DRM 
infrastructure, on the application and on the type of content to be protected. 
2.1.3. Access & Usage control  rules 
As the two preceding sections make clear, there are strong commonalities between access 
control and DRM control. In both cases, the control policy grants privileges on a set of objects to 
a set of subjects. There are also distinctions between access control and DRM. As stated earlier, 
(database) access control models are highly concerned by the sharing granularity, leading to the 
use of assertional languages (either SQL or XPath) to identify the objects, and the subjects, 
targeted by a rule. Conversely, DRM is primarily concerned by the conditions and obligations 
related to how a privilege can be exercised on a digital asset. This lead to integrate two new 
concepts in the rule definition, namely context and obligation. Context is used in DRM scenarios 
to assess a contextual predicate (e.g., “the number of films produced by Gaumont watched in the 
last 7 days is more than 3”) conditioning the activation of a given privilege (e.g., “to watch a free 
of charge film”). Obligations are mandatory actions associated to the exercise of a privilege (e.g., 
“append a new record to the audit trail”).  
For the reasons given in the introduction, we advocate in this chapter the convergence 
between the access control and DRM worlds, encompassing fine grain access control and 
accurate usage control. To this end, we consider in the sequel general Access and Usage Control 
(AUC) rules expressed by <subject[Q], object[Q], sign, action, context[Q], obligation>, where:  
• subject[Q] defines the set of grantees for that rule, expressed by a qualification Q over 
the domain of subjects and roles; 
• object[Q] defines the set of objects targeted by the rule, expressed by a qualification Q 
over the object domain; 
• sign denotes either a permission (+) or a prohibition (-); 
• action is the operation the subject is authorized/forbidden to exercise on the object; 
• context[Q] defines the conditions which must be met to make the rule activable, 
expressed by a qualification over the set of objects materializing the subject context 
(history of subject’s actions, audit trail, etc). 
• obligation is the procedure the system is mandated to achieve when the subject 
exercises a granted action; we assume here that this procedure sums up to perform 
updates in the subject context (e.g., logging an action). 
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2.2. Secure Enforcement of access & usage control 
2.2.1. Enforcement of access & usage control 
In database environments, the access control is usually enforced by the database server 
and sometimes by the application server. In both cases, the underlying assumption is that the 
server is trusted.  As stated in the introduction, the server security has been shown weaker than 
expected in a number of situations. This motivated the design of new architectures where the 
server role amounts to deliver raw content to smart clients implementing the access control 
(Bouganim et al., 2004; Hacigumus et al., 2002). In addition, important use cases (e.g., selective 
dissemination, parental control) require performing the control on client devices. The question 
becomes how to enforce AUC rules on the client side. Except in very specific situations where 
the client device can be trusted (e.g., an ATM terminal), the challenge is to build an incorruptible 
AUC rule evaluator on untrusted client devices.  
This section reviews the main approaches tackling this challenge and evaluates them in 
the light of the following criteria: (1) tamper-resistance, (2) ease and cost of deployment, (3) 
platform agnosticisms (i.e., whether a subject can exercise her privileges whatever the device she 
is using at a particular time), (4) expressive power of the AUC model and (4) privacy 
preservation. 
Secure software. Software-based enforcement systems consist of a secure code executed 
on the client device to evaluate AUC rules and render regulated contents. Representative 
examples are the couples Fairplay / itunes from Apple and Windows Media Rights Manager / 
Windows Media Player from Microsoft which both control access and usage of music files. The 
unquestionable advantages of software-based solutions are their low cost and ease of deployment 
(e.g., over the internet) and their powerfulness (there is no particular limitation of the AUC 
model which can be supported). The counterpart is manifold. First, the security of the 
enforcement process is weak, as any software is vulnerable by nature. In particular, the integrity 
of the secure software code (a prerequisite to a correct execution) cannot be definitely assessed 
in an untrusted environment (Hauser et al., 2003). This weakness is important considering that (i) 
any customer is a potential attacker, (ii) the attacks can be conducted with impunity from the 
private sphere, and (iii) a single pirate can break the security of the whole system by distributing 
the crack on the internet. In addition, device and software agnosticisms are difficult to achieve. 
The former requires developing and embedding the secure software in any rendering devices 
(common computers but also mp3 player, car music players, etc.) and the latter binds the 
consumer to the use of an exclusive software. Finally, AUC rules involving context (e.g., based 
on past subject actions) are either impossible to evaluate (unless all actions are performed from 
the same device) or require centralizing the context information on a server thereby hurting 
subject’s privacy.  
Secure hardware. Hardware solutions can be seen as trusted black boxes receiving an 
encrypted content and delivering the clear text of its authorized subset according to the AUC 
rules. For example, set-top-boxes used for decoding Pay TV in Europe are equipped with secure 
microcontrollers like the STi5202 decoder chip. The Microsoft NGSCB initiative1 relies on a 
secure chip, called the Trusted Computing Modules (TPM), to enforce DRM on common 
computers). Today, standards are emerging for defining hardware-based content protection for 
                                                 
1 formerly Palladium, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next-Generation_Secure_Computing_Base 
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home network devices, e.g., SVP Secure Video processor (SVP). Hardware-based solutions 
provide an unequalled level of security. Indeed, hardware is much more difficult to tamper than 
software, security protection is formally proven (and Evaluation Assurance Level can be 
assigned given completed Common Criteria (Common Criteria)) and large scale piracy is 
difficult to organize in case a chip is broken. If the secure chip comes in a portable and pluggable 
form factor (e.g., a USB secure token), it provides a nice answer to the platform agnosticisms (at 
least for devices equipped with a USB port) and privacy preservation requirements (the subject 
context is hardware protected and never centralized). On the other hand, hardware based 
solutions are more costly to deploy, linking manufacturers to higher investments and longer time 
to market (Grimen et al., 2006). More, current solutions largely underexploit the storage and 
computing capabilities of secure chips, thereby supporting only basic DRM models (raw 
decryption of multimedia flows).  
The objective of this chapter is precisely to go one step further and show that, despite 
limited hardware resources, secure chip solutions can be devised to support trusted, powerful and 
privacy conscious AUC models. To understand how far we can go in this direction, it is 
mandatory to have a closer look at the current secure chip hardware constraints and at their 
forecast evolution.  
2.2.2. Background on secure chips 
The term secure chip refers to a monolithic chip providing strong anti-tampering features, 
whatever its actual form factor (i.e. physical sizes and shapes) ranging from the well known 
smart card to chips embedded in smart phones, USB keys and other forms of pluggable smart 
tokens. Note that powerful server-based secure coprocessors like the IBM 4758 (Dyer et al., 
2001) fall outside this definition and are not discussed in this chapter. Secure chips share strong 
hardware commonalities and differ mainly in their interface to the host they connect to (Vogt et 
al., 2003).  
Today’s secure chips typically embed on a single silicium die: a 32 bit RISC processor 
(clocked at about 50 MHz), memory modules composed of ROM (about 100 KB), static RAM 
(some KB) and electronic stable storage (hundreds of KB of EEPROM or FLASH), and security 
modules enforcing physical security. The ROM is used to store the operating system, fixed data 
and standard routines. The RAM is used as working memory (heap and stack). Electronic stable 
storage is used to store persistent information, and holds data and downloaded programs. In the 
following, we analyze the main hardware trends for secure chips highlighting its very unique 
internal resource balance. 
CPU resource: during the last ten years, embedded processors improved from the first 8-
bit generation clocked at 2 MHz to the current 32 bit generation clocked at 50 MHz with an 
added cryptographic co-processor. At least two factors advocate for a continuous growth of CPU 
power. First, the rapid evolution of secure chip communication throughput (e.g., high delivery 
contactless cards, USB cards) allows secure chip applications to evolve towards CPU intensive 
data flow processing using cryptographic capabilities (e.g., DRM). Second, many efforts from 
secure chip manufacturers focus on multi-applications and multi-threaded operating systems 
demanding even more CPU power. In addition, note that increasing the CPU power as little 
impact on the silicon die size, an important parameter in terms of tamper-resistance and 
production cost on large scale markets. 
RAM resource: secure chips hold today a few KB of static RAM, almost entirely 
consumed by the operating system (and the Java virtual machine in Java enabled chips). The gap 
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between the RAM left available to the applications on one side and the CPU and stable storage 
resources on the other side will certainly keep on increasing. First, manufacturers tend to reduce 
the hardware resources to their minimum to save production costs. The relative cell size of static 
RAM (16 times less compact than ROM and FLASH, 4 times less compact than EEPROM) 
makes it a critical component, which leads to calibrate the RAM to its minimum (Anciaux et al., 
2003). Second, minimizing the die size increases the tamper-resistance of the chip, thus making 
physical attacks trickier and more costly. RAM competing with stable memory on the same die, 
secure chip manufacturers favour the latter against the former to increase the chip storage 
capacity, thus enlarging their application scope.  
Stable storage resource: the market pressure generated by emerging applications leads to 
a rapid increase of the storage capacity. Taking advantage of a 0.18 micron technology allows 
doubling the storage capacity of existing EEPROM memories. At the same time, manufacturers 
are integrating denser memory on chip, like NOR and NAND FLASH. NOR FLASH is well 
suited for code due to its "execute-in-place" property but its extremely high update cost makes it 
poorly adapted to data storage. NAND FLASH is a better candidate for data storage though its 
usage is hard. Reads and writes are made at a page granularity and any rewrite must be preceded 
by the erasure of a complete block (holding commonly 64 pages). Researchers in memory 
technologies aim at developing highly compact non-volatile memories providing fast read/write 
operations with fine grain access (e.g., MEMS, PCM, etc.) but this must be considered only as a 
long term perspective. Note that mass storage smart cards appear today in the market place, 
combining in a USB key form factor a smart card-like secure microcontroller connected by a bus 
to a Gigabyte-sized external (and then unprotected) NAND Flash module (Anciaux et al., 2007).  
To conclude, secure chips appear as rather unusual computing environments and can be 
summarized by the following properties: (1) High processing power wrt the amount of RAM and 
on-chip data; (2) Tiny RAM wrt the amount of on-chip data; (3) Fast reads but slow and 
sometimes complex writes/rewrites in stable storage. 
2.3. Trusted AUC architecture 
From the above discussion, we argue that secure chips can be a cornerstone of future 
trusted, powerful and privacy preserving AUC systems. This section describes such an 
architecture, centred on the secure chip and being agnostic with respect to the other components 
of a DRM system (client device and software, content server, licence server, etc). Figure 2 
pictures this architecture and illustrates the software components and data which must be 
embedded on chip to enforce AUC rules of the form <subject[Q], object[Q], sign, action, 
context[Q], obligation>. 
Being able to evaluate subject[Q] requires first authenticating the subject (the secure chip 
holder), leading to embed an authentication module and authentication data (credentials). The 
subject authenticates himself to the secure chip thanks to a PIN code and the secure chip 
authenticates itself to the other components of the system thanks to a cryptographic protocol, 
thereby implementing a strong authentication mechanism.  Then, predicate Q can be evaluated 
over the subject credentials (e.g., subject.age > 18) to check whether the rule can become active. 
To deliver the plaintext authorized result, the AUC engine must determine first which 
AUC rules are concerned by the subject request (may be more than one). Then, for each of these 
rules, it must (i) evaluate object[Q] and context[Q] thanks to the query processor and (ii) execute 
the obligation if the rule turns out to be active. The effect of this last step is in turn to update the 
context data (e.g., adding a record in an action trail). 
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Rules, objects and context data can be stored in plaintext in the secure chip (since 
embedded data is physically protected by the chip), encrypted on an external medium (e.g., 
transmitted from a remote server or stored on an insecure external memory), or both. For 
instance, in a DRM scenario, contextual data could be maintained on chip to protect the subject 
privacy, AUC rules (i.e., licenses) could be downloaded from a license server, and finally objects 
(i.e., the digital content) could be stored on a DVD medium or be downloaded from a content 
server. 
Elements stored on an external medium must be cryptographically protected to protect 
them against any forms of attacks which could be conducted by intruders, insiders, 
administrators or even by the subject himself (the secure chip holder). Basically external data 
must be encrypted to resist to snooping attacks, must contain secure checksums (e.g., hashes) to 
prevent from spoofing and splicing attacks, and finally must include timestamps to avoid 
replaying attacks (Anciaux et al., 2006). To this end, cryptographic modules and associated keys 
have to be embedded on the chip. Note that embedded data (e.g., the AUC rules) can be 
dynamically updated through a secure channel established with a remote source. 
The AUC software embedded in the secure chip acts as an incorruptible mediator 
between the content provider and the content consumer and protects equitably the interest of both 
parties. The AUC system suggested above provides the content provider with a tangible (i.e., 
hardware based) guarantee against piracy. Indeed, the secure chip holder himself has no access to 
the embedded data (except those permitted by the AUC rules) and has no way to tamper it. In 
commercial DRM scenarios, privacy is usually a lesser concern and the consumer is asked to 
trust the server to protect data that can be gathered about him and his activity. The architecture 
sketched above re-establishes equity by providing the consumer with the same guarantees about 
the protection of his own data. To this respect, the roles of consumer and producer of information 
are inverted.  
Internal 
objects
Context 
data
AUC 
rules
Crypto. keys & 
auth. info
Authentication
[Query]
Plaintext authorized results
Secure chip
Subject
External
objects
Context 
data
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rulesCrypto-protected data
AUC control 
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Authentication
Decryption
Integrity
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Administrator
 
Figure 2. Functional architecture of a trusted AUC system 
As section 4 will exemplify, this architecture is not tight to commercial DRM scenarios 
and can apply to any situation where sensitive data is exchanged between an information 
producer (could be a patient) and a consumer of this information (could be a physician querying 
 A Hardware Approach for Trusted Access and Usage Control 11 
the patient medical folder). The following roles can be distinguished, independently of the 
scenario: 
• information producer: he is in charge of (1) protecting the storage of his data and (2) 
defining the adequate AUC policy to regulate the access and usage of his data. 
Whether obligations are integrated in the AUC policy, evidences of the fulfilment of 
these obligations must be given back to the producer. Data storage protection can rely 
on traditional server security (e.g., content servers) or on secure chip (e.g., embedded 
personal folders). 
• information consumer:  he can query/use the produced data according to his own 
privileges as defined in the AUC policy. 
• trusted AUC engine: It is in charge of (1) enforcing the AUC rules, (2) checking the 
integrity of all incoming data, (3) securing the storage of embedded data if any, (4) 
supporting dynamic updates of embedded data. Whether obligations are integrated in 
the AUC policy, the AUC engine must build evidences of the fulfilment of these 
obligations. This means securing the storage of the subject context (the target of the 
obligations) and making this context queryable by the AUC engine, either to evaluate 
context dependent AUC rules or to allow the information producer auditing the AUC 
policy. 
3. HARDWARE BASED SECURITY ELEMENTS 
The trusted AUC architecture sketched in Section 2 needs further research efforts to 
become a reality. This section presents two previous works which can contribute to the definition 
of this architecture. The first work, presented in section 3.1, deals with the enforcement of XML 
access control policies over streaming documents thanks to a secure chip. The second work, 
presented in section 3.2, deals with the management of data embedded on chip. 
3.1. Hardware enforcement of XML access control rules  
When they do not rely on secure hardware, client-based access control solutions rely on 
data encryption. The data are kept encrypted at the server and a client is granted access to 
subparts of them according to the decryption keys in its possession. Sophisticated variations of 
this basic model have been designed in different contexts, such as DSP (Hacigumus et al., 2002), 
database server security (He et al., 2001), non-profit and for-profit publishing (Miklau et al., 
2003; Bertino et al., 2001; Microsoft Inc.) and hierarchical access control (Akl et al., 1983; 
Birget et al., 2001; Ray et al., 2002). By compiling the access control policies into the data 
encryption, these solutions minimize the trust required on the client at the price of a rather static 
way of sharing data. Indeed, whatever the granularity of sharing is, the dataset is split in subsets 
reflecting a current sharing situation, each encrypted with a different key, or composition of 
keys.  Thus, access control rules intersections are precompiled by the encryption. Once the 
dataset is encrypted, changes in the access control rules definition may impact the subset 
boundaries, hence incurring a partial re-encryption of the dataset and a potential redistribution of 
keys.  
To circumvent the drawbacks mentioned above, we designed a solution taking advantage 
of secure hardware on the client side (Bouganim et al., 2004). This solution is a client-based 
access control manager capable of evaluating dynamic access control rules on a ciphered XML 
document with the benefit of dissociating the access control management from encryption. The 
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problem addressed can be stated as follows: (i) to propose an efficient access control rules 
evaluator coping with the hardware constraints of a secure chip: first, the limited amount of 
secured memory precludes any technique based on materialization (e.g., building a DOM (W3C 
DOM) representation of the document); second, the limited communication bandwidth lead to 
minimize the amount of data to be downloaded in the secure chip; (ii) to guarantee that 
prohibited information is never disclosed: the access control being realized on the client device, 
no clear-text data but the authorized ones must be made accessible to the untrusted part of this 
client device; and (iii) to protect the input document from any form of tampering: under the 
assumption that the chip is secure, the only way to mislead the access control rule evaluator is to 
tamper the input document, for example by substituting or modifying encrypted blocks. 
To tackle this problem, we made the following contributions (Bouganim et al., 2007):  
1. Accurate streaming access control rules evaluator: We proposed a streaming 
evaluator of XML access control rules, supporting XP{[],*,//}, a robust subset of the 
XPath language (Miklau et al., 2002). The choice of a streaming evaluator allowed 
coping with the secure chip memory constraint. Streaming is also mandatory to cope 
with target applications consuming streaming documents. At first glance, one may 
consider that evaluating a set of XPath-based access control rules and a set of XPath 
queries over a streaming document are equivalent problems (Diao et al., 2003; Green 
et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2002). However, access control rules are not independent. 
They may generate conflicts or become redundant on given parts of the document. The 
proposed evaluator detects these situations accurately and exploits them to stop as soon as 
possible rules becoming irrelevant.  
2. Skip Index: We designed a streaming and compact index structure allowing to quickly 
converge towards the authorized parts of the input document, while skipping the 
others, and to compute the intersection with a potential query expressed on this 
document (in a pull context). Indexing is of utmost importance considering the two 
limiting factors of the target architecture: the cost of decryption in the secure chip and 
the cost of communication between the chip, the client and the server.    
3. Pending predicates management: Pending predicates (i.e., a predicate P conditioning 
the delivery of a subtree S but encountered after S in the document) are difficult to 
manage. We proposed a strategy to detect eagerly the pending parts of the document, 
to skip them at parsing time (whenever possible) and to reassemble afterwards the 
relevant pending parts at the right place in the final result.  
4. Integrity checking with random accesses: We combined hashing and encryption 
techniques to make the integrity of the document verifiable despite the forward and 
backward random accesses generated by the Skip Index and by the support of pending 
predicates. 
5. Dynamic access control policy management: The dynamicity of access control 
policies requires refreshing the access control rule definitions on the secure chip. We 
proposed a solution to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of this refreshing 
mechanism as well as to guarantee the consistency of the rule updates with respect to 
the processed document in order to avoid any unauthorized access. 
The remaining part of this section summarizes the streaming evaluation of access control 
rules, the integrity checking and the dynamic access control policies management. A complete 
description of the solution can be found in (Bouganim et al., 2007). 
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3.1.1. Streaming evaluation of access control rules  
For each element of the input document, the access control rule evaluator must be 
capable of determining the set of rules that applies to it to determine the outcome for that 
element. The access control rule evaluator is fed by an event-based parser (SAX) raising open, 
value and close events respectively for each opening, text and closing tag encountered in the 
input document.  
Each access control rule (i.e., XPath expression) is represented by a non-deterministic 
finite automaton (Hopcroft et al., 1979), named Access control rule Automaton (ARA for short). 
An ARA is made of states connected by transitions (see Figure 3). Tokens traverse the ARA 
while transitions are triggered, at document parsing time. An ARA has one target final state 
(representing the element targeted by the access control rule) and may have zero, one or more 
predicate final states (one for each predicate involved in the access control rule). When all final 
states of an ARA have been reached by a token, the corresponding access control rule becomes 
active, meaning that it applies to the forthcoming elements. Figure 3 shows the token positions in 
the ARA corresponding to a rule R1 at the time the parser analyses the leftmost element of an 
XML document representing an agenda.   
The following data structures are maintained in the secure chip to manage the set of ARA 
representing a given access control policy: 
R1: //Appointment[Category=“Work”]/Content/Notes
Appointment Content
Category ="Work"*
Appointment
*
Notes
State
Transition
Target final state
Predicate final state
Token
 
Figure 3. Access control rule automaton 
 
• Token Stack: The Token Stack memorizes the progress of tokens in all ARA and 
allows backtracking in the ARA. 
• Authorization Stack: The Authorization Stack registers the rules having reached their 
target final state and is used to solve conflicts between rules. The status of a rule 
present in the stack can be: positive-active (⊕ : forthcoming elements will be delivered), 
positive-pending (⊕? : the delivery of the forthcoming elements is conditioned by a 
predicate not yet evaluated), negative-active (  : forthcoming elements can be 
skipped), negative-pending ( ? : the skip of the forthcoming elements is conditioned by 
a predicate not yet evaluated).  
• Predicate Set: this set memorizes the predicates already evaluated.  
The outcome of the current element can be easily determined from the information kept 
in these data structures, thanks to the conflict resolution algorithm presented in Figure 4. In the 
algorithm, AS denotes the Authorization Stack and AS[i].RuleStatus denotes the set of status of 
all rules registered at level i in this stack. In the first call of this recursive algorithm, depth 
corresponds to the top of AS. 
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DecideElement(depth) → Decision ∈ {⊕, ,?} 
1: If depth = 0 then return ‘ ’  
2: elseif ‘ ’∈ AS[depth].RuleStatus then return ‘ ’ 
3: elseif ‘⊕’   ∈ AS[depth].RuleStatus and  
4:         ‘ ?’ ∉ AS[depth].RuleStatus then return ‘⊕’ 
5: elseif DecideNode(depth -1) = ‘ ’ and  
6:         ‘⊕?’ ∉ AS[depth].RuleStatus then return ‘ ’ 
7: elseif DecideNode(depth -1) = ‘⊕’ and  
8:         ‘ ?’ ∉ AS[depth] RuleStatus then return ‘⊕’ 
9:  else return ‘?’ 
 
Figure 4. Conflict resolution algorithm 
Integrity checking with random accesses 
Encryption and hashing are required to guarantee respectively the confidentiality and the 
integrity of the input document. Unfortunately, standard integrity checking methods are badly 
adapted to our context for two important reasons. First, the memory limitation of the secure chip 
imposes a streaming integrity checking. Second, the integrity checking must tackle the forward 
and backward random accesses to the document incurred by the Skip index and by the 
reassembling of pending document fragments. In this section, we sketch the solutions we 
proposed to face potential attacks on an input document.  
In a client-based context, the attacker is the user himself. For instance, a user being 
granted access to a medical folder X may try to extract unauthorized information from a medical 
folder Y. Let us assume that the document is encrypted with a classic block cipher algorithm 
(e.g., DES or triple-DES) and that blocks are encrypted independently (e.g., following the ECB 
mode (Schneier, 1996)), identical plaintext blocks will generate identical ciphered values. In that 
case, the attacker can conduct different attacks: substituting some blocks of folders X and Y to 
mislead the access control manager and decrypt part of Y; building a dictionary of known 
plaintext/ciphertext pairs from authorized information (e.g., folder X) and using it to derive 
unauthorized information from ciphertext (e.g., folder Y); making statistical inference on 
ciphertext. Additionally, if no integrity checking occurs, the attacker can randomly modify some 
blocks, inducing a dysfunction of the rule processor (e.g., Bob is authorized to access folders of 
patients older than 80 and he randomly alters the ciphertext storing the age). 
To face these attacks, we exploit two techniques. Regarding encryption, the objective is 
to generate different ciphertexts for different instances of a same value. This property could be 
obtained by using a Cipher Bloc Chaining (CBC) mode in place of ECB, meaning that the 
encryption of a block depends on the preceding block (Schneier, 1996). This however would 
introduce an important overhead at decryption time if random accesses are performed in the 
document. As an alternative, we merge the position of a value with the value itself at encryption 
time. Regarding integrity checking, the document is split into chunks whose size is determined 
by the memory capacity of the secure chip. Each chunk contains an encrypted ChunkDigest 
computed using a technique adapted from the Merkle hash Tree (Merkle, 1989). This technique 
gracefully combines encryption and hashing functions to allow random accesses to any part of 
the document with an 8 bytes alignment. The most original part of the proposed strategy is that 
integrity is checked in cooperation with the untrusted terminal at the price of decrypting one 
digest per visited chunk in the worst case (i.e., when the chunks accessed are not contiguous). As 
a conclusion, the document is protected against tampering and confidentiality attacks while 
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remaining agnostic regarding the encryption algorithm used to cipher the elementary data. 
Unlike (Hacigumus et al., 2002; Bouganim et al., 2002), we do no assumption on any particular 
way of encrypting data that could facilitate the query execution at the price of a weaker 
robustness against cryptanalysis attacks. 
3.1.2. Dynamic access control policy management 
Dynamicity of the access control policies is a mandatory feature for a number of 
applications. This led us to design a secure mechanism to refresh the access control rules on the 
secure chip. Depending on the application scenarios, access control rule updates may be done 
pro-actively, requiring updates systematically before accessing the document, reactively when 
rule updates are detected, or even be disseminated jointly with the data. The update protocol 
must ensure three complementary properties: (i) confidentiality since access control rules 
definition may disclose unauthorized information; (ii) integrity since rule modification may 
mislead the rule processor; (iii) consistency, meaning that the set of access control rules stored on 
the secure chip must be up-to-date with respect to the processed document. 
Access control rules confidentiality and integrity are enforced thanks to the encryption 
and hashing mechanisms presented above. Ensuring consistency is more difficult. Inconsistency 
between the set of access control rules and the document may appear as a result of a malicious 
user whom may, for instance, filter the update flow, replay the document or the update flow. In 
any case, the secure chip must detect it and not deliver any data. Inconsistencies appears when a 
new access control policy is applied to an old document, thus potentially revealing  unauthorized 
outdated data, or conversely, when an outdated access control policy is applied to a recent 
version of the document, thus revealing unauthorized up to date data. Both problems are solved 
using a crypto-protected cross reference versioning between the document and the access control 
rules.    
3.2. Protection of on-board data 
3.2.1. Databases on chip: existing approaches and systems 
The value of secure chips to manage personal folders has been recognized in several 
domains like healthcare (medical folder), commerce (loyalties), telecommunication (address 
book) or mobile computing (user’s profiles containing licenses, passwords, bookmarks, etc). In 
this spirit, MasterCard published the MasterCard Open Data Storage (MODS) API (Mastercard 
Inc.), allowing retailers, banks and other organizations to access and store data on customers’ 
smart cards with an enhanced security for the holder. This motivated the design of data 
management techniques dedicated to secure chips.  
Historically, the first attempt towards a DBMS embedded in a secure chip is ISOL’s 
SQLJava Machine (Carrasco, 1999)] and the ISO standard for a smart card database language, 
SCQL (International Standardization Organisation, 1999). Both are addressing generation of 
secure chips endowed with 8 kilobytes of stable memory, explaining a design limited to low data 
volumes and simple database techniques. Since then, more elaborated secure chip DBMS have 
been developed. PicoDBMS (Pucheral et al., 2001; Anciaux et al., 2001) was the first full-
fledged relational DBMS embedded in a smart card. PicoDBMS supports a robust subset of the 
SQL standard (full relational algebra) encompassing SCQL. The PicoDBMS kernel acts as a 
doorkeeper that authenticates the users and solely delivers the data corresponding to their 
privileges. In the relational context, the powerfulness of the access control is directly determined 
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by the complexity of the (relational) views that can be built. To provide fine grain privileges, 
PicoDBMS supports complex query processing including select, project, join and aggregate 
operations. While PicoDBMS was exclusively designed to store stable data in EEPROM, other 
works consider secure chips endowed with FLASH memory (Bolchini et al., 2003).  
Recently, a benchmark called Data management in Secure Chip (DiSC) has been 
proposed (Anciaux et al., in press) to help designing database techniques for secure chips. In 
particular, this benchmark enables to (1) compare different database techniques embedded on 
secure chips, (2) predict the limits of on-chip applications, and (3) provide co-design hints.  
3.2.2. Challenges related to data storage and indexation 
Designing appropriate data management techniques for secure chips is not 
straightforward. Light versions of popular DBMS like Sybase SQL Anywhere Studio (Giguère, 
2001), IBM DB2 Everyplace (Karlsson et al., 2001), Oracle Lite (Oracle Corp., 2002) and 
Microsoft SQL Server for Windows CE (Seshadri et al., 1999) have been developed for 
lightweight devices, but they do not address the more severe limitations of secure chips (see 
section 2.2.2).A thorough re-thinking of all database techniques is mandatory to tackle accurately 
the secure chip hardware constraints. We summarize below the main database challenges 
incurred by secure chip data management in terms of storage, indexation and query processing.  
Storage and indexing challenge. Traditional (disk-based) database servers are designed to 
fit fast sequential and slow random disk accesses, hence data locality plays an important role. 
The tradeoffs introduced by electronic stable memories (mainly FLASH or EEPROM) are totally 
different (cf Section 2.2.2). For example, EEPROM shares commonality with RAM in terms of 
access granularity (a memory word) and read performance (60-100 ns/word), but suffers from a 
dramatically slow write time (about 10 ms per word). Locality is no longer an issue, making 
disk-oriented structures irrelevant. Moreover, space consumption is an important concern in an 
embedded context. The challenge is then to devise compact structures for both data and indexes, 
adapted to the particularities of the access properties inherent to electronic memory.  
Query execution challenge. Traditional query processing techniques typically resorts to 
materialisation (of intermediate results, hash tables, etc.) in the main memory and/or in swapping 
areas on disks. On the contrary, on-chip query execution strategies preclude materialisation. 
Within a secure chip, RAM is a scarce resource (Anciaux et al., 2003), and electronic memory is 
less appropriate for swapping (e.g., EEPROM exhibits a very slow write time, FLASH read/write 
costs exhibit a strong asymmetry and erasure is expensive). The challenge is then to devise RAM 
conscious query execution strategies, optimally avoiding swapping. Note that the two challenges 
are not independent since a lack of main memory for query processing may be compensated by a 
massive indexing. 
3.2.3. EEPROM and Flash-based solutions 
We precisely addressed these challenges when designing PicoDBMS in the particular 
context of a relational database and of EEPROM based secure chips. We sketch below the 
PicoDBMS design as an illustration of how the data management techniques required by a 
trusted AUC engine could be implemented. Of course, considering a different hardware platform 
(e.g., Flash based) or a different database model (e.g., XML) would lead to a different design.  
PicoDBMS design has been driven by the following rules (Pucheral et al., 2001): 
Compactness rule (minimize data, index and code footprint), RAM rule (minimize RAM 
consumption), Write rule (minimize writes in EEPROM), Read rule (take advantage of very fast 
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reads in EEPROM), Access rule (take advantage of low granularity and direct reads in 
EEPROM), CPU rule (take advantage of the over-dimensioned CPU) and Security rule (never 
externalize private data, minimize code complexity). The resulting technical solutions in terms of 
storage, indexing and query execution are summarized below. 
Storage and indexing model. PicoDBMS takes advantage of a compact pointer-based 
model to meet the Compactness, Read and Access rules altogether. This model exploits a 
combination of Flat storage (FS) where tuples are stored sequentially and attribute values are 
embedded in tuples, Domain Storage (DS) where values are grouped in domains and attribute 
values are replaced by pointers within tuples and Ring Storage (RS) where each domain value is 
linked with a ring of pointers to all tuples sharing this value. FS is adequate when the attribute 
does not present value redundancy. DS precludes any duplicate value to occur and then acts as a 
compression technique. RS plays the role of an index. It links together all tuples sharing the same 
attribute value through a circular chain of pointer headed by this value. This chain of pointer is 
stored again in place of the attribute values, providing a similar and compact implementation of 
both select and join indices. 
Query execution strategy. PicoDBMS relies on so called extreme right deep trees to meet 
the RAM and Write rules. It executes all operators (including select, project, join, group by and 
aggregate computations) in a pure pipeline fashion to avoid any materialization. Pipelining join 
and aggregate computation is not easy. Natural joins (equijoins on key, foreign key pairs) are 
computed efficiently without RAM thanks to the ring index (see previous paragraph). For 
aggregate computation, a Cartesian product is introduced between the operands of the group by 
clause at the bottom of the tree, such that (1) the tuples sharing a same grouping value are 
naturally produced together at the tree leaves, (2) aggregation is computed at the tree root, one 
grouping value at a time. In (Anciaux et al., 2003), we provided a more general framework for 
designing RAM-constrained query evaluators.  
PicoDBMS has been developed on Java (Anciaux et al., 2001)  and C (Anciaux, 2004), is 
running on different smart card platforms and it performance has been assessed using the DiSC 
Benchmark (Anciaux et al., in press), demonstrating that complex on chip data management 
techniques can be implemented today. 
4. SCENARIOS 
This section illustrates the benefits of the AUC architecture in two different contexts: a 
fair DRM scenario and a healthcare scenario. It reports on experiments conducted in the field, 
with real prototypes running on advanced smart card platforms. These prototypes are not strict 
implementations of the AUC architecture presented in Section 2 but rather adaptations of the 
main ideas.  
4.1. A Fair DRM scenario  
Due to the poorness of their model and the inflexibility of their architecture, existing DRM 
systems badly adapt to new attractive usage scenarios. In addition, consumers are reluctant to use 
them for privacy preservation and fairness concerns. Indeed, exasperating coercive methods do 
nothing but legitimizing piracy (Champeau, 2004).  
In (Bouganim et al., 2007(2)), we presented a new software and hardware infrastructure 
aiming at reconciling the content providers’ and consumers’ point of views by giving the ability 
to develop fair business models (i.e., that preserve the interest of both parties). The proposed 
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infrastructure, named MobiDiQ (Mobile Digital Quietude), is an XML-based tamper-resistant 
right management engine embedded in a secure chip. It enforces licenses/contracts (i.e. access 
and usage control rules) depending both on the digital content accessed on the device (the 
objects) and on personal data (i.e., the context) stored securely on the chip. The MobiDiQ access 
right engine is embedded in the secure chip to prevent any tampering to occur, thereby giving 
strong anti-piracy guarantees to the content provider. Embedding personal data in the chip brings 
also strong guarantees about user’s privacy preservation.  
MobiDiQ is able to enforce versatile and powerful AUC policies required to develop 
fairer business models. For instance, commercial conditions can be negotiated between 
institutions and content providers to help some categories of citizen (e.g., students) to access 
valuable contents at a special rate. Parental control rules can also be set up to protect children 
against dangerous contents but also against a prohibitive use of legal commercial contents. 
Privacy preserving gifting and loaning scenarios can be supported as well (Axalto Simagine, 
2005).  
Let us illustrate the MobiDiQ behavior on a fair superdistribution scenario (a student 
accessing content negotiated by her University). Figure 1 in Section 2 showed a sample of the 
XML metadata attached to a given video. The video is divided into several tracks (film, bonus, 
analysis), each one subdivided in sequences that include descriptions, values indicated the rating 
in terms of violence, sex content, decryption keys, etc. Figure 5 shows the user’s profile and the 
access control rules expressing the licenses downloaded by the user. The user’s profile records 
the fact that this user is a master student of the University of Versailles by means of certificates 
(simplified in the Figure).   
 
<Profile> 
  <SIM_PrivateKey> xdxdxd </SIM_PrivateKey> 
  <UV_Student> xabc </UV_Student> 
  <UV_Master> shqdq </UV_Master> 
  <Group value = “John”> JohnGrpPrivateKey </Group> 
  …. 
</Profile> 
Profile XML Data 
Video License:  
 Require University_Versailles License 
 Rule R1: < UV_Member, play, ⊕, /Video/Film> 
 Rule R2: < UV_Member, play, ⊕, /Video/Bonus> 
 Rule R3: < UV_Member, play, ⊕, /Video/Analysis> 
 
University_Versailles License 
 Rule R4: < [not /Profile/UVStudent], play, Θ, 
/Video/Bonus> 
 Rule R5: < [not /Profile/UVMaster], play, Θ, 
/Video/Analysis> 
 Rule R6: < ALL, play, Θ, //Seq[SexRating > 3]> 
 
Licenses 
 
Figure 5. Profile and licenses 
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In this example, MobiDiQ has to deal with two licenses. The first one is issued by the 
content provider and states that any member of the University of Versailles may have the right to 
play the Film (R1), Bonus (R2) and Analysis (R3) track of the video. The second license, 
delivered by the University of Versailles adds some restrictions, specifying that the Bonus track 
is restricted to students (R4) while the Analysis track is restricted to Master students (R5). 
Finally, the last rule expresses that any sequence rated with a degree greater than 3 for sex 
content should not be played. The Require statement stipulates that the second license is 
mandatory to enable the first one. Note that a required license always restricts the possibilities of 
the user (Rules R4, R5 and R6 have a negative sign). Indeed, the university cannot grant more 
right than the one delivered by the content provider itself.  
Roughly speaking, the MobiDiQ engine can be seen as a DRM virtual machine with 
XPath access control rules as bytecode and is nothing but a simplified instance of the trusted 
AUC architecture presented in Section 2.3. More precisely, the example above illustrates the 
enforcement of AUC rules of the form <subject[Q], object[Q], sign, action> but little effort is 
required to extend it with context and obligation.  
4.2. Healthcare scenario 
PlugDB2 and DMSP3 are respectively a research and an experimental project conducted 
in the context of a medical-social network providing care at home for elderly people. There 
common objective is to improve the healthcare coordination while giving the control back to the 
patient over the access and sharing of her medical and social data.  
Today, the coordination among the participants of this network (e.g., doctors, social 
workers) is organized around a paper-based folder. This folder stays at home and is consulted 
and updated by every participant. This solution suffers from two main drawbacks. First, the 
paper-based folder is the primary source of confidentiality breach since no access control can be 
settled but hiding the complete folder. Second, the folder cannot be accessed and filled remotely, 
precluding remote diagnosis and leading to incomplete content.  
To solve these problems, a trusted AUC architecture is being developed and relies on a 
new hardware component, called Secure Portable Token (SPT). A SPT combines, in a USB key 
form factor, a smart card-like secure chip and an external (i.e., unprotected) Gigabyte-sized 
NAND Flash. 
The basic idea is to place the patient in the centre of the scene, giving her the full 
ownership of her medical folders, as enacted by the legislation but seldom put into effect in 
practice. According to the AUC dialect, patients are considered as information providers and 
practitioners as information consumers. The peculiarity here is that the information is actually 
produced by the practitioners (e.g., medical prescriptions), but it remains the property of the 
patient who is in charge of protecting its storage and regulating access to it. Hence, in the 
simplest setting of the architecture, each patient is equipped with a personal SPT storing securely 
                                                 
2  PlugDB is a research project funded by the French National Agency for Research (ANR). It involves the following partners: 
INRIA (the French National Research Institute in Computer Sciences), University of Versailles, SANTEOS (EHR provider), 
Gemalto (world leader in the smart card domain), ALDS (a home care association) and CoGITEY (a clinic with a section 
dedicated to elderly people).  
3 DMSP is an experimental project funded by the Yvelines district council in France. It experiments the PlugDB technology in 
the field and involves the same partners as PlugDB. See www-smis.inria.fr/~DMSP for details about these two projects. 
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the patient folder (encrypted in the NAND Flash) and enforcing AUC rules (thanks to an AUC 
engine embedded in the secure chip), just like a trusted portable personal database server. 
A more complex setting is required (1) to guarantee the durability of the patient folder in 
case of crash or loss and (2) to allow remote diagnosis/updates by practitioners. To this end, a 
central server is used and provides a permanent internet connection to the practitioners and 
replicates part of the patient folders. As detailed in (Anciaux et al., 2008), the patient may choose 
different status for different parts of her folder, the two main interesting statuses in the context of 
this chapter being secret data and confined data. Secret data is exclusively stored on the patient 
SPT and can be accessed exclusively by the practitioner physically in front of the patient, with 
the restrictions imposed by the AUC policy. Confined data is data a patient may want to make 
durable or to share among a reduced circle of trusted persons (e.g., the family doctor), with the 
guarantee that nobody else can access it. To do this, the patient SPT encrypts the confined data, 
replicates the encrypted data on the central server and shares the encryption keys with the SPTs 
of people belonging to this trusted circle. This sharing scheme is possible under the assumption 
that every participant (including the practitioners) is equipped with a personal SPT. Again, note 
that the SPT holder has no free access to the SPT content and has no way to tamper it so that 
practitioners will still undergo the AUC control when accessing confined data.  
According to Figure 2, the SPT plays a dual role. When the practitioner connects to a 
patient SPT and issues queries, the patient SPT acts as a trusted server guaranteeing a secure 
storage for the patient data and enforcing the AUC rules fixed by the patient. From the AUC 
engine point of view,  AUC rules and context data is internal to the secure chip but patient data is 
stored encrypted within the SPT NAND Flash and is considered as external4. When the 
practitioner connects to the central server and issues queries over confined data, her own SPT 
plays the same role as above, except that (1) the AUC rules are external (even if they are cached 
internally, the original copy is in the patient SPT and a crypto-protected refreshing mechanism 
must take place through the central server) and (2) the patient data is external to the SPT, stored 
encrypted on the central server. 
5. FUTURE TRENDS AND CONCLUSION 
The scenarios presented above show that the trusted AUC architecture promoted in this 
chapter can pave the way for more powerful and versatile DRM models. DRM is no longer 
synonym of basic conditional access to videos and sound assets. It can be understood in a 
broader sense encompassing every situation where (1) sensitive information has to be shared 
among partners having different privileges, (2) the expression of privileges includes access and 
usage control with contextual conditions and obligations, (3) the enforcement of the control must 
be guaranteed even in untrusted client devices.   
Typically, the healthcare scenario opens up interesting perspectives towards a trusted 
AUC management of various personal information like scholarship or insurance folders and even 
information captured by our ambient intelligence surrounding (e.g., electronic surveillance of 
elderly people at home, employees monitored at work). Nothing justify that this information is 
less protected today than commercial digital assets. However, several technical challenges 
remains to be addressed before a general, robust and efficient trusted AUC architecture becomes 
a reality. Some of them are sketched below. 
                                                 
4 This choice has been made because the small on chip stable storage cannot accommodate a complete medical folder. 
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Limited storage capacity of secure chips: the stable storage of secure chips cannot 
accommodate a large volume of protected data. In new hardware architectures like SPT, the 
secure chip is connected by a bus to an external mass storage (within the same token) where 
protected data can overflow. However, external storage is not tamper resistant and must be 
protected against snooping, spoofing, splicing and replaying attacks. Designing cryptographic 
protections adapted to a database usage remains an open challenge for large datasets. Moreover, 
data can even overflow on a central server or be hosted on a server to increase availability (cf. 
healthcare scenario), adding a communication overhead to the encryption/decryption cost. This 
means that a new memory hierarchy should be considered (on-chip RAM, on-chip stable storage, 
off-chip token memory and server memory) along with ad-hoc cache management strategies 
adapted to data access patterns, object size, availability/connectivity considerations, etc.  
Context ownership and resiliency: AUC rules may be based on the context of the 
consumer (e.g., a condition on her past actions) and may impose the obligation to fill in an audit 
trail accessible by the information provider. This raises a set of problems still open in our current 
design. First, the context of the consumer must be complete and up-to-date. This might be 
achieved by forcing her to access to any content through her own token (e.g., in the healthcare 
scenario, a practitioner accessing a patient folder would be forced to connect her own token to 
activate the AUC rule). Second, the context must be made resilient to avoid the consumer 
intentionally loose her secure chip and thereby potentially gaining more privileges by cleaning 
up her context.  Third, the audit trail must be made accessible to the information provider in any 
situation. This introduces the problem of the audit trail location, protection and ownership and 
would probably lead to separate the audit trail from the context data. 
Temporal AUC rules: temporal conditions have already been considered in commercial 
DRM models (XRML) and increase their expressive power and versatility. Typically, being able 
to express that a privilege can be exercised for a given duration (e.g., a one week trial), during a 
given time period (e.g., during working hours, during the week-end), possibly associated to a 
particular event (e.g., a diagnosis cannot be updated two days after an examination) is of general 
interest.  The challenge here is that secure chips usually are not endowed with an internal clock 
and rely on the device they are plugged into to get time information. How to integrate a secure 
time server in a trusted AUC architecture is an interesting open issue. 
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TERMS 
Secure Operating Environment: A combination of hardware and software modules 
providing a tamper-resistant storage and execution environment protecting against any 
form of snooping and tampering attacks.  
Access Control Policy: Set of rules regulating the use of the resources of a system, each 
rule granting or revoking the right to access some data or perform some action in that 
system.  
Usage Control: complements access control with contextual predicates, conditioning the 
activation of a given privilege, and obligations, i.e., mandatory actions associated to the 
exercise of a privilege. 
 
Access control models: 
DAC: The Discretionary Access Control model (DAC) gives the creator of an object the 
privilege to define the policy regulating access to this object, and granted privileges can 
be transmitted between users.  
MAC: The Mandatory Access Control Model (MAC) attaches security level to objects 
and clearance level to users in a centralized way.  
RBAC: The Role Bases Access Control Model (RBAC) introduces the concepts of Roles 
and Teams to improve the administration of access control policies for a large population 
of cooperating users.  
Attackers: 
Intruder: a person with no database privilege, who infiltrates a computer system and 
tries to extract valuable information from the database footprint on disk.  
Insider: a person properly identified by the database server (i.e., a registered user) who 
tries to get information exceeding her own privileges. The owned privileges give her 
more abilities than the intruder to tamper the system and to deduce valuable unauthorized 
content.  
Administrator: a person who has enough (usually all) privileges to administer a 
computer system (System Administrator) or a DBMS (Database Administrator or DBA). 
These privileges give her the opportunity to access the database files and to spy on the 
DBMS behavior (e.g., main memory monitoring).  
Attacks: 
Data Snooping: an attacker examines the (potentially encrypted) data, on disk, in the 
memory or on the communication links and deduces unauthorized information.  
Data Spoofing: an attacker deletes or modifies (even randomly) some data, thereby 
potentially corrupting the evaluation of access and usage rules and/or query evaluation. 
Data Splicing: an attacker replaces a valid data by another valid data. This attack may 
lead to reveal unauthorized data, corrupt the evaluation of access and usage rules. 
Data Replaying: an attacker replaces a valid data by one of its older version. For 
instance, replaying old access rules may lead to disclose unauthorized data. 
